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BOOK REVIEWS
REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION
By Robert E. Liton and William D. Nordhaus
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. 224, $25.00 hardcover, $7.95 paper.
Reviewed by Walter Olson *
It is a common complaint that to let elected officials influence the
outcome of the regulatory process is to invite a sellout to the "special
interests." This complaint is even heard from the elected officials
themselves: Representative James Florio (D-N.J.) recently said that
letting Congress and the President pass on certain environmental regu-
lations would amount to "politicizing the rule-making process" and
would provide "a great opportunity for all the special interests to stop
regulations from taking effect."'
Of course, it is a perfectly plausible and traditional view that Con-
gress lacks the time, unity of purpose, or expertise to handle the details
of regulatory implementation. But there are also objections when exec-
utive political officials try to influence regulatory matters-and not just
at the "independent" commissions, but at such executive branch agen-
cies as the EPA. Many political moralists who favor "democratic ac-
countability" in other contexts thus find themselves in the strange
position of opposing "interference" in regulatory matters by either of
the elected branches of government. In effect, the only parts of govern-
ment that can make ongoing regulatory policy decisions with some
show of legitimacy are the civil service and the courts-both of which
are virtually free from voter scrutiny, and enjoy (de facto and dejure,
respectively) life tenure in their jobs.
Robert Litan and William Nordhaus are unapologetic about re-
jecting this line of argument. They write that politicizing the regula-
tory process "is precisely the objective. The regulatory process is a
political process." 2 Moreover, they argue, if the elected branches of
government take a stronger role in the rulemaking process, the result-
ing regulations are likely to be not only more democratically arrived at
but also, on average, more economically efficient.
The authors preface their recommendations with a clear and suc-
cinct statement of the mainstream regulatory reform position. That
• Mr. Olson is with the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., where he is Associ-
ate Editor of Regulation. B.A., Yale University, 1975.
1. Washington Post, November 5, 1983, at A4, col. 4.
2. LITAN AND NORDHAus, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 180 (1983).
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position predicts that agency bureaucracies isolated from voter influ-
ence are likely to go astray in a number of ways. Much regulation, the
authors note, is undertaken to correct "externalities": for example, the
water pollution that a steel mill emits because it has no incentive to
take into account the costs it is imposing on downstream users. The
problem with this approach, they say, is that a regulatory agency has
equally incomplete incentives, but in reverse: the agency is instructed
to concern itself only with the costs to downstream users and not with
the costs of compliance that it inflicts. The result is that it tends to
regulate inefficiently, not only by choosing the "wrong" level of re-
quired emissions, but, at least as important, by choosing an overly
costly means of achieving that level. Often the inefficiency involves
relying on "command-and-control" regulations instead of incentive-
based measures such as taxes, sliding financial penalties, and marketa-
ble rights.3
Moreover, each agency and each division of each agency will at-
tempt to pursue its mission single-mindedly with less heed to other and
perhaps more important societal goals. Not all agencies will enjoy
equal success in their mission, however, which will lead to a patchwork
of stringent and less than stringent regulation. One result is that there
is an enormous range in the values that agencies implicitly place on life
and health-all the way from as little as $34,000 per life for guardrails
and certain other traffic safety improvements, through $22,000,000 for
coal mine safety standards, to as much as $1,000,000,000 per life saved
for nuclear-waste disposal requirements.4 This discrepancy implies
that society would be both richer and safer if some of the resources now
used on nuclear waste disposal were devoted to traffic safety instead.I Some of these problems can be remedied by inducing agencies to
carry out better analysis of their regulatory decisions. The past four
presidential administrations have been trying to do this, with gradually
increasing success. Litan and Nordhaus provide a broad survey of the
efforts of the Carter Administration (within which they served,
Nordhaus as a member and Litan as a staffer of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers) to foster better regulatory analysis through the Regu-
latory Analysis Review Group and the Regulatory Council. The
Reagan Administration's Executive Order 12291' can be understood as
a logical extension of these earlier Carter efforts, although perhaps one
great enough to amount to a difference in kind.
3. Although it is not part of their main line of reasoning, the authors make one point about
regulatory efficiency that is too timely not to quote, in view of the controversy over the
AT&T divestiture:
By and large, we do not consider the regulatory system an appropriate tool for income
redistribution. To use regulation rather than taxation for distribution of income to
truckers or farmers is generally wasteful: a considerable fraction of the revenue goes
to the wrong persons, and an unnecessary outlay of real resources is . . . involved.
Id at 7.
4. See generally R. WILSON & E. CROUCH, RISK/BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1982).
5. Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
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Even if agencies have the best analysis in the world, unfortunately
they may not be allowed to act on it. For instance, Congress still pre-
vents agencies in many instances from balancing costs and benefits, as
in the case of the Delaney Clause,6 which forbids the use in food of any
substance linked to cancer in animals (such as saccharin), no matter
how tiny the cancer risk or how great the benefit involved. Similarly,
the Clean Air Act provisions require the Environmental Protection
Agency to set its air quality standards without regard to costs.7 Such
zero-risk statecraft might be called "Alpo legislation": environmental-
ists seem to enjoy the idea that unnatural substances have been kept
below detectable thresholds in the same way that Alpo buyers seem to
enjoy knowing that they aren't feeding their dogs even "a speck of ce-
real"-whether or not the dogs themselves would know the difference
if they did.
But it is not enough, the authors say, simply to remove the bars to
cost-benefit analysis or even to require that agencies take cost-benefit
findings into account when they regulate. There is still no setting of
priorities, no "cross-agency rationality." If the government tried to en-
act all arguably beneficial regulations in a single year, the economy
could not stand the cost burden, just as taxpayers could not stand it if
the government tried to appropriate money for all worthy causes at the
same time. There is, so to speak, a liquidity as well as a solvency con-
straint. Thus the need arises for some ordering of priorities across
agencies-in effect, to budget their activities.
The courts are peculiarly ill-suited to assume this sort of grand
managerial role if only because they receive for review a mere fraction
of regulatory decisions. That leaves Congress and the executive
branch. The Reagan Administration has made more than a casual ef-
fort to make executive oversight systematic, again through Executive
Order 12291.8 The White House's oversight of executive branch agen-
cies seems to have survived court challenge, 9 but its oversight of the
independent agencies remains rather weak. As the authors say, "execu-
tive oversight of regulation has finally pulled out of the station, but it is
a long distance from its final destination.""l
If taken to its most ambitious extreme, centralized oversight of reg-
ulatory activity would take the form of a regulatory budget. Such a
budget would be an "impositions budget." That is, it would consist of
annual ceilings on the amounts each agency could require private par-
ties to spend. Imposition costs are a sort of funny money, something
like "tax expenditures." Both concepts may seem plausible on the
micro level, but they begin to lose analytical utility as they move to the
6. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. V 1981).
8. Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
9. The key case is Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
10. LITAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 2, at 81.
19841
Journal of Legislation
macro level because of problems with double counting, joint causation,
data uncertainty, and so on. "Assume, for example, that the costs of
meeting environmental rules on a coal-fired electricity generating plant
became so large that a utility decided to build a nuclear plant whose
costs were virtually all mandated. What fraction of the nuclear power
plant cost should be imputed to regulation?""
The idea of budgeting such costs sounds visionary, and no wonder.
On straight spending issues, the Federal Government followed the
traditional authorization/appropriations pattern for about 140 years
before the executive branch ever began submitting budgets to Congress
by law, and it was another sixty years before Congress adopted its own
separate budgeting process. In the case of regulations, on the other
hand, there has never been even the equivalent of an appropriations
process-just authorizations, and vague authorizations at that. After
Congress enacts something like the Clean Water Act, having little or no
idea what it will cost the private sector, the relevant agency walks off
with the issue without needing further congressional consent.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that proponents of regulatory
budgeting have failed to come up with a convincing blueprint. They
face the task of creating from scratch a mechanism whose model took
centuries to develop. The problem of measuring compliance costs
might be resolved, Litan and Nordhaus suggest, if some independent
agency like the General Accounting Office were charged with the task
of verifying the estimates. But they acknowledge that other severe
problems would remain in implementing any regulatory budget. Agen-
cies could evade the budgetary constraints in various ways. For exam-
ple, many agencies can choose between adjudication and rulemaking as
a way to introduce new regulatory requirements, and if it becomes
harder for them to pursue rulemaking they may simply switch to adju-
dication instead.12 Moreover, it is not easy to come up with sanctions
to discipline agencies caught overstepping their permissible burden
limits.
One year's budget would, for reasons of practical workability, prob-
ably have to cover only proposals for new regulation, rather than the
much larger ongoing cost of old regulations. It would also have to in-
clude in the current year's budget the whole stream of future costs im-
posed by the proposed regulations, discounted at some appropriate
rate. The compliance costs of different regulations follow very different
time streams. Redesigning a baby's crib may impose a one-time ex-
pense on manufacturers. But banning the construction of a particular
kind of industrial plant may impose small costs at first and gradually
growing costs in later years as existing plants become older and less
well suited to changing market needs. Yet both types of imposition will
11. LITAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 2, at 150.
12. See Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Laws Without Making Rules, REGULATION, July/Aug.
1981.
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be reduced to the same sort of single figure in a regulatory budget-
leaving the "liquidity" rationale for the budget in limbo.
In fact, the sort of liquidity rationale that underlies ordinary bud-
geting is hardly present at all in impositions budgeting. If we assume
that each individual regulation is cost-benefit justified, but that its bur-
dens fall on a different party than its benefits, then even a rather small
regulatory burden may be intolerable if it is concentrated too narrowly
on one small part of the economy. Contrariwise, a seemingly huge set
of impositions may be positively helpful to the economy provided its
burdens and benefits are widely spread. Suppose that one law benefits
consumers more than it hurts automakers, while another benefits
automakers more than it hurts consumers. Enacting both laws might
not harm anyone's welfare or even, what is at issue here, anyone's
liquidity.
Although the authors cite many serious problems of implementa-
tion, they are not utterly daunted by them. They do, however, admit
that a regulatory budget is politically impractical at the moment. In the
meantime, they propose a more modest reform that they call a legis-
lated regulatory calendar. Without going into the details of this idea
(which would undoubtedly be changed in congressional consideration
before enactment), suffice it to say that it would provide a constitution-
ally valid way for Congress to consider and vote on each year's coming
crop of important regulations. It would also require an affirmative vote
to let regulations go through. Many such schemes are being considered
by Congress in the wake of the Supreme Court's Chadha 13 decision.
The distinctive thing about this one is that, by making each year's regu-
latory votes a package deal, it would encourage Congress to treat regu-
lation as an ongoing issue in itself (deserving, perhaps, its own
committee in each House) and to consider explicit trade-offs between
different agencies' activities. Whether or not the members of Congress
decide to adopt such an idea, they could profit greatly from this book-
if only because of the arguments it furnishes to vindicate congressional
involvement in regulatory policymaking.
13. Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
1984]
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THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC
GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES
By Mancur Olson
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982. Pp. xi, 242, notes, index. $14.95
hardcover.
Reviewed by Jim Jaffe*
Stability is a drag and long-term stability can become a paralyzing
economic malady. So writes Mancur Olson, who explains that calm
allows the painstakingly difficult creation of special interests that inevi-
tably are the enemies of the public interest. When the United States
brags that it is the longest-running democracy around, Olson appar-
ently argues, it may be pointing to a curse rather than a blessing. Dis-
tributional coalitions, a.k.a. special interests, apparently are something
like temperamental plants. Few seeds germinate. But the ones that do
grow with a vengeance, becoming an economic kudzu that can threaten
the entire society.
This somewhat flip summary may be a disservice to Olson, who is
nothing if not serious. Only the pitch is flamboyant, with jacket copy
that resembles a patent medicine ad, promising to explain "the rapid
postwar growth of West Germany, Japan, Korea .. , the slow growth
and ungovernability of Britain in recent times . . the decline of old
cities in the midst of expanding countries, unemployment, depression
and stagflation" as well as, believe it or not, "a great deal more." Only
a cure for cancer is missing.
The good news is that Olson seems to come close to making good
on this vast promise. The bad is that the book is dense. The enthusias-
tic and diligent reader senses that there is a best-seller fighting to ex-
tract itself from the lengthy discussion of monocausality. John Naisbitt
could have discovered a megatrend here. It isn't new, but does provide
more insight into how our nation works than do many pop theories.
Given time, the theory goes, people will organize. Stability pro-
vides the needed environment. Organizations will work to maximize
the economic clout of members. A group can generally win a quicker,
easier gain by trying to get itself a bigger piece of the existing pie rather
than by joining a coalition to bake a bigger pie.
The flaw in this strategy becomes evident when times are tough and
the pie begins to shrink while the organized players use their collusive
power to hold the size of their share constant. So the problem gets
worse over time. The unorganized create their own groups to protect
* Mr. Jaffe is Administrative Assistant to U.S. Representative Richard A. Gephardt, D-Mo.,
B.A., Antioch College, 1965; M.S., Columbia University, 1966.
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their rations from shrinking during future hard times and the competi-
tive segment of the economy contracts. That's why the poor remain in
poverty. And the Reagan budget cuts were aimed at the poor who were
already hungry rather than at the middle class where a diet might have
been more logical.
A few subthemes flesh out the theory. If organizations are unavoid-
able, large, broad-scale ones are to be preferred to small, narrow ones.
In other words, industrial unions are less of a threat than craft unions.
This explains what politicians intuitively grasp-that small groups are
more powerful than large groups. Strength in numbers is an overrated
strategy because large groups must encompass a range of interests that
weakens their focus. Similarly, large markets are better than small
markets because they are more difficult to cartelize. For the same rea-
son, young markets are preferable to mature markets. That's why the
United States, with the world's largest and most dynamic market, did
so well for so long.
On this point, in a discussion of the value of customs unions, Olson
comes as close to being rhapsodic as his prose style will permit. Free
trade is good because it creates larger markets. But some say the Japa-
nese experience defies this logic. They claim that the Japanese en-
courage collusion and thereby become stronger. Olson says the miracle
of modem Japan lies not in the destruction of industrial capacity in
World War II that forced collective efforts to create efficient new facto-
ries, but rather in the war's destruction of powerful discrete groups that
were able to protect themselves. The racial homogeneity of Japan may
make the creation of broad groups more feasible, but there is also some
evidence that stability is beginning to take its toll.
Is Olson right? If he is, is there something we can do short of losing
a major war to break free of this creeping paralysis? His analysis is
impressive-facts from all over the world and a variety of eras
agreeably march on stage and fit themselves into the theory. They sug-
gest a process that is inevitable and perhaps irreversible. Recent events
in the United States, however, suggest otherwise.
What about the cable television industry? How could such upstarts
challenge the theory and prevail? Why is the percentage of the Ameri-
can labor force in unions steadily declining? Whatever motivated a
group of politicians to push so hard and so successfully for the deregu-
lation of the transportation and communications industries in
America? Does anyone believe that the special interests here have
more power now than they did a century ago when they provided the
trustbusters with such an inviting target?
This doesn't deny that special interests still threaten to overwhelm
the public interest. But what's to be done? Olson and some airline
managers seem to see bidding the labor price down as one strategy for
a return to health. Whatever logic this view has is limited by the nega-
tive political reaction. Perhaps more palatable is Lester Thurow's sug-
19841
182 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 11:180
gestion that workers be provided with guarantees of security that will
wean them away from special interest groups and let nature take its
course. The rest of the remedy isn't clear.
There is, of course, a theory holding that stability promotes the type
of ossification that makes powerful, large institutions vulnerable to
small, creative new challengers. And there are even some who would
argue that America's stability has proven to be a strength rather than a
weakness.
